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Some evolutionary psychologists and economists explain assault, rape, and murder as rational actions, benefitting the perpetrator or the perpetrator’s genes.
mrswdk wrote:I read the other day that reading information that supports the views you already hold leads to a release of endorphins (i.e. it is physically pleasurable). I guess that means that it is morally good to only read news sources that support your world view.
DoomYoshi wrote:The arguments have become too convoluted, so I'll start from the top.
There are two realities. One is the "is" reality. This is the objective reality of science. The other is the "ought" reality. This is the subjective reality of laws, governments, tribes and happiness. To pretend that you rely only on objective science and then actually use subjective science is a lie, plain and simple.
Science can't make value statements. Period. It can tell you if something is, but not if something ought. Science can never answer the question "is this good?". How can you prove that happiness is good? Misery loves company, so maybe misery is good.
DoomYoshi wrote:You've made a choice to be irrational -- it's not necessary to turn your back on reality and science and immerse yourself in fairy tales. Yes, we are all burdened with our reptilian brains, but these help our bodies get through, and enable our higher brain functions to work.
I haven't turned my back on science. I rely fully on all the observable evidence. That is how I was able to build a systematic philosophy from the ground up. Unless you do likewise you don't even have a reptilian brain but rather the brain of a lobster.
DoomYoshi wrote:There are two observable principles in human life - sex and violence. Closely related to these two is enforcing your will upon others
DoomYoshi wrote:Until your worldview can adequately explain these three things, it is a faulty worldview. You can try to sweep murder under the rug as much as you like
DoomYoshi wrote:The call is to go forth and show the glory of God in your works
DoomYoshi wrote:Volcanoes are beautiful, mountains are beautiful, space is beautiful. That's kind of my point. The world would be so much more beautiful if humans weren't on it. All you do is ugly up the scenery. Yet it's not for me to question God.
mrswdk wrote:DoomYoshi wrote:Volcanoes are beautiful, mountains are beautiful, space is beautiful. That's kind of my point. The world would be so much more beautiful if humans weren't on it. All you do is ugly up the scenery. Yet it's not for me to question God.
Isn't beauty subjective? Natural landscapes can be cool but my favorite landscapes are crumbling human-made ones, primarily those from the late 19th/early 20th centuries. Think old Victorian factories, crumbling 1930s ballrooms in downtown Detroit, footage from inside the wreck of the Titanic, that sort of thing. Even with impressive natural scenery I always think adding something industrial improves the view. Some of my favorite views ever were things I saw in the countryside in northern China: great expanses of plains with random apartment blocks in the middle of nowhere, mountains and valleys with a mile-long coal train passing through them, that sort of thing.
Also, do you remember the boss N Tropy from Crash Bandicoot? He had a big tuning fork that he used to attack you with shock waves. I was just wondering what the meaning of the word 'entropy' is that lends itself to being that bad guy's name. Thanks in advance. mrswdk.
Quite against her mother’s wishes, she worked for a year with an Oxford entrance coach (then, as now, big business) and enrolled herself in a correspondence course in Latin, intending to apply to Somerville College, Oxford. A 19th-century foundation for women’s education, Somerville had a reputation for high academic standards. When she was admitted to study PPE (philosophy, politics and economics), her mother worried for her prospects. A friend comforted her: ‘At least she doesn’t look clever.’
She arrived at Somerville in that momentous year 1939, her clothes conspicuously more impressive than the homemade wartime chic the other women in her year were sporting. She made the acquaintance of Murdoch, Anscombe, and Mary Scrutton (later Midgley). Between the one-on-one or small-group tutorials she received in the traditional Oxford way, and the intense conversations with her peers, she received a philosophical education of great concentration and eccentricity.
The men – both dons and undergraduates – were, for the most part, away. As the women educated in those years later found, this made for an atmosphere of discussion quite unlike the one both before and after the war. With the young men away, there was no one to sustain the compulsive ‘argy-bargy’ – to use the term popular in the 1930s – of the inter-war decades. As Midgley put it in a letter to The Guardian in 2013:
[I]n those wartime classes – which were small – men (conscientious objectors etc) were present as well as women but they weren’t keen on arguing. It was clear that we were all more interested in understanding this deeply puzzling world than in putting each other down.
Foot was sent for tutorials in philosophy to a young man called Donald MacKinnon. Even by Oxford’s demanding standards, MacKinnon was an odd man. He would lie on the floor and beat the walls, brandishing a poker and attacking the fireplace. He was given to painfully long, reflective silences, when it was simply unclear if he could hear what was said to him. But once his terrified students discovered that neither he nor they would come to any serious harm, they would find themselves in the middle of the most exhilarating conversations they had ever had.
Conversations with MacKinnon were wide-ranging, open-ended and intense. There was no attempt to shut up anyone by declaring their claims nonsensical or meaningless. The philosophers of the late 1930s, still reeling from the publication of A J ‘Freddie’ Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936), had been much given to that sort of thing. Among dozens of other brash claims, Ayer’s classic book – which brought the radical ideas of a circle of intellectuals in 1930s Vienna back home to Britain – had declared that all ethical discourse, being unverifiable, could not strictly speaking be true or false. In expressing a moral judgment, one was really ‘evincing’ one’s emotions or attitudes, no more and no less.
Oddly enough, Ayer saw himself as rescuing the claims of ethics from the dustbin to which he thought a yet earlier academic had inadvertently consigned it. In the early years of the 20th century, the Cambridge philosopher G E Moore thought that he had shown something of great interest about the nature of morality with an argument of devastating simplicity: that the ‘good’, so central to all morality, cannot be the name of a natural property. It can’t, for instance, be another name for pleasure – as he took some Victorian ‘utilitarian’ philosophers to be saying. Surely it is possible to ask of something: ‘Yes, this is conductive to pleasure, but is it good?’ The question feels ‘open’, not yet settled – and that, he thought, could reveal something interesting and deep. If there is such a thing as goodness, it is not to be found in nature, and therefore, not to be investigated by those who make it their business to study nature, ie scientists and their philosophical apprentices.
Most philosophers agreed that there was something to Moore’s idea, but not everyone took it to have the same conclusions. For the Austrian philosophers from whom Ayer got his best ideas, the notion of properties ‘outside nature’ was exactly the kind of unscientific nonsense from which they hoped to rescue their canny, sceptical generation.
Wrong and right, bad and good were all slightly misleading ways of saying – in effect –‘Boo!’ and ‘Hurrah!’. Religion and aesthetics went more or less the same way, all dismissed as worse than false.
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A few years later, the full extent of the Holocaust came to be known. Could someone looking at photographs of the death camps at Bergen-Belsen and Auschwitz-Birkenau continue to maintain that ethical judgments were ultimately not the sort of thing to be true or false? If some judgments couldn’t be true and other ones false, what was there to be said about, if not to, the Adolf Eichmanns of this world? That he had his attitudes (‘Hurrah genocide!’) and we had ours (‘Boo!’)? Combine that with the further view that there is nothing to make one set of attitudes any better than any other, and one had a position that Foot thought ‘had to be bad philosophy’.
The Viennese positivists’ dismissal of ethical and religious discourse as unverifiable, and therefore merely expressive, was an exciting novelty when the enemy was the ancien régime of clergymen and courtiers. The war changed everything. What had seemed tough-minded and revolutionary now seemed merely complacent. As Murdoch informally put it in a documentary interview in 1972, it betrayed the smug assumption that:
[W]hatever anybody’s likely to think about morals is going to be more or less okay. I mean, one might say it’s a sort of pre-Hitler view. It’s a view which goes with our sort of 19th-century optimism and a feeling of progress and a feeling that people are fundamentally decent chaps, a view which after recent history […] one cannot in general take.
What would a moral philosophy look like if it started from a darker picture of human beings as not, basically, ‘decent chaps’? Part of what animated Foot and her allies was a conviction that the answer to such a question would not be easy or self-contained, would not be the sort of logical proof one could polish off in a few weeks, if one were only clever enough. When they returned to Oxford to take up fellowships at its colleges, their influence was not immediately felt. The clever young men were back from the war, inclined to patronise their female colleagues, and carry on where they had left off.
Temperamentally unsympathetic both to religious solutions and to mystical ones, Foot looked for considerations that even Hare might recognise. In the beginning, her chosen line of attack focused on unsettling the sharp distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘value’ that she found in Hare and other philosophers of the age. Where, she asked, did this leave such a concept as rudeness? By anyone’s standards, to pronounce some behaviour as rude is to make a value judgment. But there are objective criteria for counting some behaviour as rude (rather than, say, polite or cowardly). We don’t get to choose.
She took the point further: perhaps the reason we cannot freely choose which facts are relevant to whether some action is rude (or cowardly or polite or treacherous or whatever) is that these concepts are related in some way to human good or harm. That, and not some point of logic, is what marks them out as moral evaluations. Only a few years after Hare and Sartre thought that they had buried these old-fashioned ideas for good, Foot was trying to bring essence back.
Like other philosophers before and since, Foot’s achievement consisted in pointing us in a better direction. Instead of looking to logic or language for answers, she suggested that we look to ‘the reality that surrounds man’. Human nature is a complex thing, and understanding it will take all the resources of the sciences – natural and social – as well as history. But the significance of those enquiries will lie ultimately in what they can say about the kinds of lives that might be good for us. And to know that, we must ask: who are we? What do we need – for ourselves, and from each other? And what must we be like to get it?
Foot’s point, from the start, was that we cannot simply choose answers to these questions. There is something to get right here, and everything at stake.
Symmetry wrote:And yet taking meaningful action against gun violence is still the the most effective, proven method of reducing murders.
DoomYoshi wrote:Symmetry wrote:And yet taking meaningful action against gun violence is still the the most effective, proven method of reducing murders.
Like shooting the perpetrator with your own gun.
Symmetry wrote:DoomYoshi wrote:Symmetry wrote:And yet taking meaningful action against gun violence is still the the most effective, proven method of reducing murders.
Like shooting the perpetrator with your own gun.
How often has that happened in the mass-shootings of late?
DoomYoshi wrote:Symmetry wrote:DoomYoshi wrote:Symmetry wrote:And yet taking meaningful action against gun violence is still the the most effective, proven method of reducing murders.
Like shooting the perpetrator with your own gun.
How often has that happened in the mass-shootings of late?
Not enough.
"The only question is, how do we arm the other 11?"
DoomYoshi wrote:Some dick-weasel read this thread and then wrote a better version of it:
https://aeon.co/essays/how-evolutionary-biology-makes-everyone-an-existentialist
Dukasaur wrote:DoomYoshi wrote:Some dick-weasel read this thread and then wrote a better version of it:
https://aeon.co/essays/how-evolutionary-biology-makes-everyone-an-existentialist
The same unexamined faith that David Hume was the last word on the subject.
Not knocking the importance of his work, but Hume was writing in a time when Physics was still in its infancy. He saw the universe as a neutral force, which was a reasonable assumption with the knowlege of the time.
Now that we have a much more detailed understanding of how things work, a naturally-extracted ethics is entirely possible. Now that we know that the universe is not neutral, but actively trying to kill us, we can construct a complete ethics based on the war of Life vs. Non-Life, or Good vs. Evil if you prefer, or as I most often think of it, Enthalpy vs. Entropy.
Dukasaur wrote:Atheism is morality. As an atheist, at every action I have to think "Will this make my life better? Will this be beneficial to my people? Will this better the lives of other living things?" And of course, I constantly have to balance one against another. This benefits me but not my tribe, this benefits my tribe but not my family, this benefits my family but not the biosphere as a whole. I balance these things, and I have to live with the consequences. At all times I am concerned with the fate of living things.
Filed through his lawyer, the now 31-year-old said in his review petition to the Supreme Court that the air quality in New Delhi was like a "gas chamber" and its water "full of poison".
"Everyone is aware of what is happening in Delhi-NCR (national capital region) with regard to air and water. Life is going to be short, then why death penalty?" the petition added.
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